Why couldn't Israel take in the Amalekites like they did foreign
survivors in Deut 20?
[draft: Sept 23/2006] | 13 years later I answer a follow-on question: Why was Israel instructed about fighting OUTSIDE the land? That looks more offensive than defensive!
I got this question:
Hello
Glenn, I just want to say that I love your apologetics.
Personally, I believe they are the best on the net. Nonetheless,
I have a question, as usual? You said that ancient societies had
no welfare systems, however, doesn't the Deut 20 statement that women
and
children can be spared refute that
proposition? Why couldn't that
be done to Amalek?
[Personal, Tank-note: One of the many endearing things I find out about
the Tank readership comes from the "Form" of the way questions come in.
I would estimate that 75% of the questions follow the structure above:
- appreciation for the Tank;
- optional comparative comment/compliment--my fav
so far is being called "the Chuck Norris of Christian
Apologetics"--although CN would likely be insulted at the comparison, I
am still ROTFWL on that one...!);
-
Adversative conjunction "but, however, nonetheless, nevertheless,
anyway";
- the phrase "as usual" or "typical for me the inquisitive";
- the question proper;
- optional clause of resignation: "you'll
probably never [read|answer] this"];
- close
... it is item 4 that
I
find the most delightful and encouraging... the fact that these
sweeties are self-conscious of their truth-seeking and eagerness to
understand is 70% encouraging, and only 30% discouraging... it is
encouraging to find SO MANY FOLKS like this--with good hearts, open
minds, eagerness for honesty!... discouraging that they have probably
been 'censured' somewhere in the past for such questions-in
church?--and are aware of their 'disorder' (LOL)... but the sweet
spirits and learning souls of these folks lift my spirits and send me
into prayers of thanks for such unseen (but not 'unheard'!!!)
friends...]
........................................
My
reply:
First, let's actually look closely at
the war-policy text in Deut 20. Here's the
relevant text:
When
you approach a city to fight against it, you shall offer it terms of
peace. 11 “And it shall come about, if it agrees to make peace with
you and opens to you, then it shall be that all the people who are
found in it shall become your forced labor and shall serve you. 12
“However, if it does not make peace with you, but makes war against
you, then you shall besiege it. 13 “When the Lord your God gives it
into your hand, you shall strike all the men in it with the edge of the
sword. 14 “Only the women and the children and the animals and all
that is in the city, all its spoil, you
shall take as booty for yourself; and you shall use the spoil of
your enemies which the Lord your God has given you. 15 “Thus you
shall do to all the cities that are very
far from you, which are not of
the cities of these nations nearby. [Deut 20:10-15; NASB]
Let's make some observations about the text and the situation described
therein first (while noting any salient differences from the case of
Amalek):
The first
thing to note is the nature, economic condition, and location
of the enemy in this passage.
The surrounding text makes clear that these nations live at some
distance outside the allotted territory of Israel. Israel was allotted
the land of Palestine and parts of Transjordan, but the boundaries were
quite clear and quite restricted. Their dominion (via vassal treaties)
could extend further, but their displacement/ownership
could not. Israel could not colonize. There was almost
zero-motive,
therefore, for Israel to fund long-distance military campaigns to
attack foreign nations for territory, or for the economic advantages of
owning such territory. Dominion could be profitable (since it left
people to work the land for taxes/tribute; but note that war always
siphons off excess wealth, reducing the 'value' of a conquered
country), but
displacement/ownership/colonization
was much more expensive.
These cities (not nations, btw) are "enemies" of
Israel, which can only mean that they have funded/mounted military
campaigns against Israel in some form (or been key contributors to
such). As such, Israel's long-distance
military response is essentially defensive
(i.e., to reduce economic and vital loss due to an enemy) rather
than offensive (i.e., to
increase economic gain due to conquest). These cities are also
apparently wealthy, since they
are walled cities (requiring
a siege) and have mounted a long-distance military
maneuver against Israel's border. [Note: Israel's response would be
from a central army rather
than from any border garrisons,
and as such would be considerably more
expensive
than the campaign of the enemy]. Since war is always expensive, the
city will have rerouted some of
its economic resources away from
general community welfare to offensive military operations, reducing
the economic gain of victory.
By the time the policy in Deut 20 is applied locally, the enemy should
already
be clear about the outcome. They have made an offensive strike against
Israel (perhaps successful, meaning there just might be things plundered from Israel inside the city), and
they are now clearly on the defensive. The Israelite army has
surrounded the city, and all but the blindly-arrogant would recognize
that defeat is all but inevitable. This is time for sanity.
And, just for perspective, if the
army outside the gates had been Assyria, and even if the city
surrendered, they would still see their
pregnant women ripped up, their infants dashed against the stones, and
the men and children tortured. (" lenient as compared with the
barbarities often practiced in ancient warfare upon a conquered people;
the law implies no sanction or excuse for such atrocities as are
alluded to in Am. 1:3, 13, Hos. 14:1 (13:16) 2 K. 8:12, or for the
torture of prisoners, and other cruelties, perpetrated, as their own
monuments declare, by the Assyrians..." [Driver, S. R. (1902). Vol. 3: A critical and exegetical commentary on
Deuteronomy . The International Critical Commentary on the Holy
Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments (239). Edinburgh: T.
& T. Clark.] and "Ninth-century
Assyrian conquest accounts speak of burning the young boys and girls.
The practice of ripping open pregnant women is mentioned very rarely.
It is a practice attributed to Assyrian king Tiglath-Pileser I (about
1100) in a hymn praising his conquests. It is also referred to in
passing in a Neo-Babylonian lament.", [REF:BBC,
at 2 Kings 8:12])
And consider the terms of surrender to the Ammonites, in 1 Sam 11:
Nahash
the Ammonite went up and besieged Jabesh Gilead. And all the men of
Jabesh said to him, “Make a treaty
with us, and we will be subject to you.” But Nahash the
Ammonite replied, “I will make a treaty with you only on the condition that I gouge out the
right eye of every one of you and so bring disgrace on all
Israel.”
And this was a frequent result, even
in the case of
surrender-under-pressure:
"Nahash stated that he would only make
a treaty with the Jabeshites if he could put out their right eyes.
According to Josephus his terms were either surrender that would
involve the loss of everyone’s right eye, or utter destruction.
Parallels to such blinding are
provided by the Philistines who gouged out Samson’s eyes (Judg 16:21),
and in the story of Zedekiah, who was blinded by the Babylonians in 587
(2 Kgs 25:7: "
Other Assyrian sources
mention the blinding of one eye of prisoners of war, in order that they
could still be used as a work force but would have been rendered
incapacitated in war" [BBC at 2 Kgs 25].) [
WBC]
Of course, the Ammonites
sometimes went further than
that--to Assyrian levels
(Amos 1.13):
“For
three sins of Ammon, even for four, I will not turn back my wrath.
Because he ripped open the pregnant women of Gilead in order to extend
his borders..."
Notice these are totally absent from
our Deut 20 passage...
[The one case of semi-mutilation I can find before the Divided Kingdom
occurs in Judges 1, but it
is seen as a very lop-sided
case of talion and
reap-what-you sow, and NOT a standard wartime practice: "When Judah attacked, the LORD gave the
Canaanites and Perizzites into their hands and they struck down ten
thousand men at Bezek. 5 It was there that they found Adoni-Bezek and fought
against him, putting to rout the Canaanites and Perizzites. 6
Adoni-Bezek fled, but they chased him
and caught him, and cut off his thumbs and big toes. 7 Then Adoni-Bezek said, “Seventy kings with their thumbs
and big toes cut off have picked up scraps under my table. Now God has paid me back for what I did to them.”
So, (REF:BBC): "The irony in this passage is
that Adoni-Bezek was reduced to the
same condition as the seventy kings
he had previously mutilated"]
In fact, Israel/Judah might have earned a reputation of being 'soft on
crime' for this leniency! When Ahab repulses the attack of Ben Hadad
in 1 Kings 20.26ff, Ben Hadad's officials specifically mention this
(30f):
"..And
Ben-Hadad fled to the city and hid in an inner room. 31 His officials
said to him, “Look, we have heard that the kings of the
house of Israel are merciful. Let us go to the king of
Israel
with sackcloth around our waists and ropes around our heads. Perhaps he
will spare your life.” 32 Wearing sackcloth around their waists and
ropes around their heads, they went to the king of Israel"
[But later, the northern kingdom became so anti-good that even one of
their kings (Menahem, 2 Kings 15.13-16) committed these types of
horrible atrocities--but this is not what Deut
20 commands Israel to do. And there are other atrocities and
aberrations from acceptable policy which occur in the biblical text,
even in relatively 'good' times--but these are at variance from Deut 20
and do NOT impact our study here.]
.................................................................................................................
The second thing to note is the
alternate outcomes, other than war.
We should first note an oddity of
the policy: even if the city has
done damage to Israel, they are still offered peace ("shalom"). The
peace is one of submission, often considered as a vassal treaty:
"...the verse indicates that the
Israelites were to offer to the inhabitants of such cities the terms of
a
vassal treaty. If the city
accepted the terms, it would open its
gates to the Israelites, both as a symbol of surrender and to grant the
Israelites access to the city; the inhabitants would become vassals and
would serve Israel." [
NICOT]
"Offer it
shalom, here
meaning terms of surrender, a promise to spare
the city and its inhabitants if they agree to serve you. The same idiom
appears in an Akkadian letter from Mari: 'when he had besieged that
city, he offered it terms of submission (
salimam).' In an Egyptian
inscription, the prostrate princes of Canaan say
shalom when submitting
to the Pharaoh. The same meaning is found in verse 11, which reads
literally "If it responds '
shalom'
and lets you in," and in verse 12,
where a verb derived from
shalom (
hislim) is used for 'surrender'"
[Tigay, The JPS Torah Commentary]
So, they become vassals, with
requirements for forced labor. [This is corvee, btw, and not 'New World slavery'.] Here is
how this requirement is understood:
"Literally, as
'forced laborers.' Hebrew mas refers
to a contingent of forced
laborers working for the state. They were employed in agriculture and
public works, such as construction. In monarchic times, David imposed
labor on the Ammonites and Solomon subjected the remaining Canaanites
to labor...see 2 Sam 12:31; 1 Kings 9:15, 20-22; cf. Judg. 1:28-35.
When imposed on citizens, such service took the form of periodic corvee labor. Solomon, for example, drafted
Israelites to fell timber in
Lebanon; each group served one month out of three (1 Kings 5:27-28). It
is not known whether foreign populations subjected to forced labor
served part-time or permanently." [Tigay, The JPS Torah Commentary]
"The likely meaning is that the city,
through its people, was to perform certain tasks, not that individual
citizens were to be impressed." [The Torah, A Modern Commentary,
Union of American Hebrew Congregations]
"Israel must give its enemy an opportunity to make peace. Those who
accepted this offer were required to pay
taxes, perform national service, and, if they were going to live
in the Land, to accept the Seven Noahide Laws." [Tanaach, Stone Edition]
Notice how this type of forced labor seems to have been levied on BOTH Israelites and
non-Israelites--so how differentially
bad
could it have been then? The Israelite people had already been
warned about 'the draft': "
So
Samuel spoke all the words of the Lord to the people who had asked of
him a king. 11 And he said, “This
will be the procedure of the king
who will reign over you: he will take your sons and place them
for
himself in his chariots and among his horsemen and they will run before
his chariots. 12 “And he will appoint for himself commanders of
thousands and of fifties, and some to do his plowing and to reap his
harvest and to make his weapons of war and equipment for his chariots.
13 “He will also take your daughters
for perfumers and cooks and
bakers. 14 “And he will take the best of your fields and your
vineyards and your olive groves, and give them to his servants. 15
“And he will take a tenth of your seed and of your vineyards, and give
to his officers and to his servants. 16 “He will also take your male
servants and your female servants and your best young men and your
donkeys, and use them for his work. 17 “He will take a tenth
of your
flocks, and you yourselves will
become his servants. (1 Sa 8:10).
This is generally understood as the same
kind of corvee labor:
The "regulations of the kingship"
described by Samuel (with God's prompting and approval, v.10) were
totally bereft of redeeming features and consisted only of oppressive
requirements. Among the latter was the corvee (forced labor), including
compulsory induction ("make them serve," v.11) of both raw recruits
(cf. Saul's policy, 14:52) and laborers in field and foundry (v.12).
Although common in the ancient world generally, the
corvee was unknown in Israel during
the time of the judges and was
introduced there under the monarchy (cf. Mendelsohn, "Samuel's
Denunciation of Kingship," p. 21, n. 33; id., "On Corvee Labor in
Ancient Canaan and Israel," BASOR 167 [1962]: 33)... The palace-to-be
would acquire horses in great numbers (contrary to Deut 17:16), and the
king's chariots would need front runners (v.11; cf. the practice of
Absalom [2 Sam 15:1] and Adonijah [1 Kings 1:5]). Reference (v.12) to
commanders "of thousands and … of fifties" (probably shorthand for
"thousands, hundreds, fifties and tens"; cf. Exod 18:21, 25; Deut 1:15)
implies a huge standing army. The term "weapons of war" (v.12) would
become so immediately recognizable that David would be able to use it
as a figure of speech in his elegy for Saul and Jonathan (2 Sam 1:27).
Women would not be exempt from conscription
into royal service (v.13). Even in desperate times the king
would always get his share (Amos 7:1)—
a
minimum of 10 percent of the income from field and flock (vv.15,
17)." [
EBC, 1 Sam 8]
And the details are in synch with other ANE practices:
8:11.
prerogatives of kingship. Kingship
requires a supporting administration. The administration must be housed
and fed. Buildings need to be erected to house the administration, and
land must be owned by the crown. A standing army must be raised, and it
likewise must be housed and fed. The king must then have access to
laborers and goods of every sort. Taxation and forced labor were the
major means of providing for the monarchy and stood as royal
prerogatives. This would bring about dramatic political and economic
changes. This portrayal of kingship is similar to that known in the
ancient Near East of this period, particularly observable in Ugaritic
texts as the model of Canaanite kingship.
8:11.
chariots and horses.
Israel had not previously had cavalry or chariotry. This development
within a standing army required the centralized authority of kingship.
Training was required that only a permanent army could provide.
Construction and care of the chariots and stabling and caring for the
horses all required significant administrative oversight.
8:12.
infantry commanders.
In the spontaneous calling out of an army in times of emergency (as
previously practiced in Israel), trained commanders were not part of
the picture. Part of a standing army, however, involves the permanent
appointment of such officers. Such military divisions are also known
from Assyrian and Babylonian military terms, where, for instance, one
of the lower officers is the commander of fifty.
8:12.
working the king’s fields.
Once an administration is set up, certain lands become royal lands (2
Chron 26:10). Land can become forfeit to the throne as a result of
criminal activity, or land can come to the throne through lack of heirs
to inherit ancestral property. This land would be farmed to provide
food for the administration as well as to supply stockpiles against
emergency. Those who work the land may be forced laborers (in a form of
taxation), slaves from foreign peoples or debt slaves who have no other
way to recover from losses.
8:13.
cooks, bakers, perfumers.
Cooks and bakers staffed the royal scullery. The extended family of the
king and his administration (often from the extended family) would have
to be regularly fed in royal style. Additionally there may have been
prisoners of the king and household servants who would need at least
meager provisions. Perfumers performed a number of different duties at
the court. The king’s garments were regularly perfumed, and spices were
burnt in order to maintain a pleasing aroma around the palace.
Additionally some spices were recognized as having medicinal value, in
which case the perfumer might be performing the task of pharmacist.
Assyrian texts and Egyptian tomb paintings both portray elaborate
procedures for preparing these spices and ointments.
8:14–15.
land confiscation.
Attractive properties were frequent targets of royal confiscation. The
king’s administrators and favorites were rewarded and kept loyal in
this way (see comment on 22:7). This practice is well-known from
Hittite and Ugaritic materials as well as from Kassite period Babylon,
where land grants to courtiers were very common.
8:16.
commandeering of donkeys and
slaves. It was not unusual for a king to commandeer a slave who
caught his attention or stock animals that were noteworthy. The
commoner would have little choice but to offer as a gift that which had
attracted the king.
8:17.
tithe of grain and flocks as
taxes. In Ugaritic literature the tithe is a fixed payment to
the king made by each town and village. In earlier biblical passages
the tithe was treated as something due the priesthood and the
sanctuary. Here the tithe describes royal taxation. [
REF:BBC, 1 Sam 8]
So, in the case of surrender, they were simply treated almost at the same level as
'regular Israelites'???! And they were not
subjected to the
post-surrender atrocities of
mutilation, torture, and horrors of
'normal' invading armies???! [Cf. also the offer of 'shalom' within Israel: "Then the whole assembly sent an offer of
peace to the Benjamites at
the rock of Rimmon." (Jdg 21.23)]
We should also note that Israel/Judah didn't
actually take over any land ownership
in this deal, and that wealthy
individuals could apparently
maintain all/some their wealth! We know this from the case of
the conquest of Jerusalem. David conquers Jerusalem from the Jebusites,
but at least one Jebusite maintained considerable ownership (enough to
sell it to David for the Temple), and apparently remained wealthy. So
land ownership didn't seem to change hands in some of Israel's
encounters:
"Arauna
the Jebusite. When David conquered Jerusalem he did not drive
out the Jebusite inhabitants. Arauna,
having
retained a significant tract of land north of the city, is
sometimes identified as the Jebusite governor. In fact the Hurrian word
(the Jebusites are usually considered of Hurrian extraction) for a
feudal overlord is
ewrine,
leading some to believe that Arauna (variant: Awarna) is a title rather
than a name." [
REF:BBC]
But it's actually
even 'more odd' than that--a vassal treaty involved the vassal
(i.e, the 'conquered') being protected in
war by the victor (i.e., the 'conqueror'). Since
surrendering-to-service generally implied a change of loyalties, then a
new set of responsibilities accrued to
Israel:
"
When
all the kings who were vassals [ebed, 'servants']
of Hadadezer saw that they had been
defeated by Israel, they made peace [shalom]
with the Israelites and became subject [ebed,
'servants']
to them." (2
Sa 10:19).
.
"It was not uncommon in the ancient Near East for the fortunes of war
to lead to political shifts of allegiance. With the defeat of the
Aramean army, many of the villages and towns that had
formerly sworn allegiance to Hadadezer now
offered their support and tribute to David. Parallels to this
practice can be found in the Vassal Treaties of Esarhaddon as well as
in the campaign lists of most of the Assyrian monarchs." [
REF:BBC]
An example of this occurs in the story of Gibeon, which deceived Joshua
and company into making a vassal treaty with them (Josh 9). When Gibeon
(now called 'forced laborers') were under attack from the Five Kings,
they
called to Joshua for help, appealing to the covenant relationship (Josh
10.5ff):
"
Then
the five kings of the Amorites—the kings of Jerusalem, Hebron, Jarmuth,
Lachish and Eglon—joined forces. They moved up with all their troops
and took up positions against Gibeon and attacked it. 6 The
Gibeonites then sent word to Joshua
in the camp at Gilgal: “Do not abandon your servants. Come up to
us quickly and save us! Help us, because all the Amorite kings from the
hill country have joined forces against us.” 7 So Joshua marched up
from Gilgal with his entire army, including all the best fighting men."
"The Gibeonites turned to Joshua for help
because the treaty of peace (9:15)
obligated Joshua to
defend his vassals." [
EBC]
Okay, one more point here. The expense of military campaigns generally
came from "proceeds from plunder"--which would be absent in the case of
surrender!!!!
"In the ancient world, the standard
procedure was
not to pay soldiers a
wage. Instead they were given a portion of the loot taken in the
capture of villages and towns. [
REF:BBC, in
loc]
"The
plunder represented the wages of
the soldiers (Ezek 29:19). In some cases the spoil was to be
divided between the soldiers and civilians (Num 31:26-54; 1 Sam 30:24).
Plunder might consist of women, children, cattle, clothing, material,
and valuables like gold or silver (see Gen 34:27-29; Judg 5:30; Ezek
26:12). [
NIDOTTE]
Even mercenary soldiers expected an 'upside' from plunder and were
upset when dismissed with only the standard fee (2 Chron 25.10ff):
"So
Amaziah
dismissed the [mercenary] troops, who, despite their payment,
were furious over the loss of what they had anticipated as further
plunder." (
EBC, 2 Chron 25.10)
mercenaries (v6). "The use of
mercenaries in ancient Near Eastern warfare was widespread. The
Assyrians began to rely heavily on mercenaries by the reign of
Tiglath-Pileser III (reigned 745–727 B.C.). Although mercenaries were
experienced and well trained, their loyalty was often called into
question when they did not get their pay in a timely fashion, or if
they were fighting against a kindred foe. Ionian mercenaries left the
Persian camp and fought for the Greeks at the Battle of Plataea during
the Persian wars (480 B.C.).
hundred
talents of silver (v6). The talent was the largest weight measure
used in the Near East. It was comparable to three thousand shekels at
Alalakh and Ugarit in Syria and in the Old Testament (Ex 38:25–6).
One hundred talents of silver weighed about three and one quarter tons.
Obviously this was the total amount spent hiring the mercenaries and
comes to one talent of silver for each division.
This is not exorbitant pay and was just
“earnest money”—the real payoff would come in the plunder."
[
REF:BBC]
Okay, a quick summary of how odd this is, in the case
of surrender:
- Israel does not require restitution for damages.
- There is no mention of punishment of the leaders or military
personnel.
- Israel does not loot the city to pay the Israelite soldiers (they
'eat' the expense somehow).
- No one of the enemy is harmed, mutilated, or killed.
- The enemy is treated like most
other Israelites (e.g, taxes,
corvee, impression).
- The enemy is protected from foreign threats, including the people
the enemy formerly was
vassal to.
- The enemy is not uprooted from their land/homes (as would be the
case with Assyria and Babylon)
- The environment and livelihood of the enemy is not harmed.
- The enemy people do not lose land/property ownership or relative
wealth.
- The city would also--although it is not explicit in the text--be
able to participate in full trade with the then-wealthy Israel (cf. the
defeat of Ben Hadad by Ahab and the terms of surrender in 1 Kings
20.30-34)
- The city did not sink any lower in status--they would have already been a vassal to some
other power, only switching the focus
of their allegiance.
- For some reason, the men who have already attacked/been hostile
to Israel, are now trusted to act differently going forward (normally
such men are killed, to preclude further rebellion).
This is not "your standard-issue ANE
warfare",
in case you don't recognize it by now...(smile)! This is unparalleled
leniency.
So, this is one--the hoped for
one--outcome.
There is one other alternative outcome
before we get to full war/capture/execution scenario: defection during
siege.
Once the men/leaders had decided (irrationally) to not surrender to
Israel, war ensued. But it was generally a siege war (cf. the
subsequent discussion of trees used for siege works), in which the
surrounding army just cut off all supply sources to the city--to
'starve them out'. There is a distinct possibility that individuals
could abandon the city (under stealth, probably) and defect to the
Israelite camp--without harm. This was the case with the Babylonian
siege of Jerusalem, in which God begged (through Jeremiah) the people
of Jerusalem to do just this--promising them safety:
"Furthermore,
tell the people, ‘This is what the LORD says: See, I am setting before
you the way of life and the way of death. 9 Whoever stays in this city will die
by the sword, famine or plague. But whoever goes out and surrenders to
the Babylonians who are besieging you
will live; he will escape with his life." (Je 21:8)... "Jeremiah was speaking to all the people,
saying, 2 “Thus says the Lord, ‘He who stays in this city will die by
the sword and by famine and by pestilence, but he who goes out to the
Chaldeans will live and have his own
life as booty and stay alive.’" (Je 38:1).
There is no reason to doubt that this would be a plausible
scenario--here and elsewhere in the ANE. Rarely do leaders have 100%
agreement with their policies, and there are always those who are
"wiser" than the death-before-dishonor-of-defeat crowd... Not only do
such 'traitors' (from the centrist perspective--smile) occur in
scripture (e.g., Rahab of Jericho, the young man of Succoth in Judg
8.14, the sick Egyptian slave of 1 Sam 30), but they generally
perform some useful service for the 'other side'--ingratiating
themselves to their captors. This clearly elevates their status beyond
'captive', and provides a means of further integration into the
victor's community (cf. Rahab as the ancestor of David and Jesus!).
Although there are clearly defections which are simply
decisions-of-chance (cf. the lepers in 2 Kings 7.3f: "Now there were four men with
leprosy at the entrance of the city gate. They said to each other, “Why
stay here until we die? If we say, ‘We’ll go into the city’—the famine
is there, and we will die. And if we stay here, we will die. So let’s
go over to the camp of the Arameans and surrender. If they spare us, we
live; if they kill us, then we die.”), there is also the
possibility that the number
of defections would be
directly proportional to the belligerence of the city's leadership.
Successful (at the economic level necessary to support war efforts)
communities require sane merchants, practically-minded farmers,
sober-minded craftsmen. The 'stranger' the policies of the
leadership--especially when it threatens these very economic
ventures!--the more cultural dissonance and disagreement will be
present. In some other cases, these 'more sane folk' were quick to
appease a
surrounding army by turning over the 'trouble maker'--dead or alive
(e.g. the story of Joab and the wise woman of Abel Beth-maacah, 2 Sam
20).
In our case, this dissonance could manifest itself as a quick removal of
the belligerent leadership (and subsequent surrender), or large scale
defections/abandonment of the city. This is a very common occurrence,
and one that can be assumed as possible here.
.....................................................
The final outcome is basically
elimination of the continuing threat.
When the enemy leadership reveals its stubborn intent to continue its
inimical, active, aggression policy toward Israel, then the only
defensive option is to remove it totally. It does no good to eliminate
most of it, since it only takes one escapee to
come back later with an army (numerous cases in history of this! In
biblical history, we might note Hadad the Edomite and Rezon, in 1 Kings
11). And it is this outcome under discussion here.
..................................................................................................
The third
thing to note about the Deut 20 passage is some variability in the
translation.
The
NASB above makes the verb in verse 14 into something like an
imperative: "you MUST take as booty...". This "must" (worded as "shall"
in the translation) sense is given in the NASB, NKJV, and JPS modern
translations. But the verb is translated "may" or "can" (i.e.,
permissive instead of mandatory) in other modern translations: NIV,
NRSV, and Sapirstein (in the Rashi commentaries). The verbal forms
themselves are ambiguous: they are not imperative forms (as in 20.3,
"Hear, O Israel") but many verbs in the passage HAVE imperatival force
without having imperatival forms
per se (e.g., "you shall offer
peace"). And the "you shall eat of the fruit trees" in 20.19 is also
the same verbal form, but this is clearly not imperatival ('you must eat the fruit of the trees').
What this means is that we have two possible classes
of surviving women/children
(in the case of actual battle):
(1) those who are taken into Israel as
'booty' and
(2) those who are left behind in the city.
Let's take these in reverse order...
(2) Those left
behind in the conquered city. Their situation is fairly
stable (but not as good as it was before the wealthy enemy attacked
Israel).
The population mix would include the widows of all ages, females of all
ages, and adolescent males too young to fight in the army (or perhaps
otherwise exempt from military service--other nations had exemption
clauses like Israel had in the first part of Deut 20). They become the
owners of all the property, and there are many differences
between their case and the case of Amalekite survivors:
- The peoples of Deut 20 had fully-developed cities, with all the
attendant infrastructure--houses, farms, furniture, shops, water
supply, tools,
etc--while the
Amalekites, as raiders/nomads, had zero.
- The women/children of Deut 20 would have ALREADY been involved in
growing crops so they could have supported themselves and
families via
farming (like widows in Israel often had to, as well), and, at the
village/city level, there would have been some level of 'critical mass'
of people to help one another in that task. The Amalekite
raider/slavetrader had no such infrastructure and therefore no such
'base' from which the women could build a living
- These Deut20 women would have had, accordingly, general
life-support-skills at
making a living (plus they would have inherited all the land
from the
men). The Amalekite women would have had a different (more limited) set
of life-skills ( e.g., helping the men with the slave care? with slave
marketing? with looting?).
- The most important resource and
security in the ANE was land. It
could
be sold, it could be rented out (for a share of the produce), or simply
farmed. The land of these cities was apparently NOT confiscated in any
way (not being movable as plunder), so at least that resource would
have remained in the hands of the widows and young men.
- The 'children' would have included adolescent boys, who would
have been
shouldering much of the farming/merchant tasks themselves ALREADY.
Without livestock (or without much of it?--larger beasts such as oxen
might not be herded back to Israel through the Judean wilderness!), the
amount of land which
could be farmed fruitfully would be reduced to a lower level (i.e., not
enough to support a new offensive against Israel)--but it still could
be done. And of course, renting part of the land to new immigrant
tenant farmers (who
had to provide their own livestock for farming) would help here.
- God also forbade the Israelites to cut down the fruit trees when
they
besieged a city, this would have also been another means of
food-support (for sustenance or marketing)
for the survivors; and would
have also been part of the economic value
of the land, should it need
to be sold/rented. [This is
in contrast to standard military practice of the day: "The practice of
cutting down trees and laying waste the land was employed by the
Egyptians and other military powers in the Near East...Even non-fruit
bearing trees should not be cut down at random, but only in order to
fulfill particular requirements, such as building siege-works."
(NICOT)... "In the ancient Near East
military powers punished their enemies by indiscriminately laying waste
to the land. This practice made no sense in relation to the land
of Canaan for it was to become Israel’s own possession. Why should
Israel cut down trees whose fruit she could eat? And why should trees,
that were not men, be besieged? Even
in lands outside Canaan the practice was to be avoided because it
showed a lack of respect for God’s creation and an infatuation with the harsh and excessive
use of destructive power." [BKC]]
- There is also no mention of crop-damage in the rules. [There is
one
case in 2 Kings 3 where Israelites spread stones over the fields,
stopped up wells, and cut trees down, apparently to slow
the economic recovery of the enemy nation Moab, but it was of a
SERIOUS, WEALTHY, and REPEATED offender (cf. 2 Kgs 13.20b: "Now Moabite raiders used to enter the
country every spring").
This would have
been a case
of slowing
their ability to 'resume hostilities'. You can always clear land and
unstop wells, but it
just takes a while. But personally I have my doubts about the 'divine
authorization' in that passage. It is cast as a prophecy by Elisha, but it uses "you will" forms. The first couple
of these are about "you will win", but the last several are about "you
will stop wells, cut down trees", etc. That the "you will" is not necessarily
a command of God can be seen from his similar
prophecy to Hazael in 2 Kings 8.7-15 ("you will become king,
you will rip open pregnant women in Israel"), which cannot be seen as a
command, but only as a prediction. It is not obvious to me that God was
ordering the Israelite/Judahite/Edomite coalition to perform these
tasks, and it is explicitly stated that YHWH punished them with
'governmental response' (i.e., 'wrath'/NQM) for some reason. The text
doesn't say why God was
angry at them, but the scorched-earth actions is as good a candidate as
any.] But back to our case here, only the livestock and
portable goods were allowed as plunder. The crops would have stayed
with whomever was left.
So, those left behind had an adequate infrastructure base from which to
start, and without any men there, reprisal from their previous-emperor
would be avoided. [They would, however, face the danger of slave
traders and raiders themselves,
since their defenses would have been radically weakened.]
(1)
Those taken as 'plunder' by Israel. ("Been avoiding the
question as long as you could, eh, Glenn?...")
Here we want to surface any
relevant differences between this
case and the case of any Amalekite survivors, and assess the
significance.
The main
difference/problem is noted
by commentators on this passage, about the "cultural influence"
issue, between Aramean culture and the Canaanite (which included
Amalek) culture:
"The women in the nations mentioned in
20:10-15 (i.e., from the Aramean culture) were
not as degenerate as those from the
Canaanite culture. Also Aramean women adopted the religions of their
husbands. Abraham, for example, insisted that his servant get a
wife from the Aramean culture for Isaac and not a Canaanite woman (Gen.
24). Thus the women and children of those nations could be spared. But
one only needs to remember the influence of Jezebel who brought her
husband Ahab under the worship of Baal to see the destructive effects
of marriage to a Canaanite wife." [
BKC]
[Remember, it was the destructive degeneracy of the Midianite wives
which was the catalyst in their
own execution
and the execution of tens of thousands of Israelite males, see
midian.html. One
can easily suspect that Amalek's strongly anti-Israelite
hatred/perspective--resulting in hundreds of years
already of constant
aggression against the
Israelites--was not confined to the
males
of the population... ]
In other words, these Aramean women/children (the only group of people
beyond Transjordan, btw) were
not threats
to Israel (or at least 'less a threat'), and
would be more likely to be assimilated into Israel successfully. [One
of Israel's creeds even began "my father was a wandering Aramean...",
referring to Jacob, in Deut 26.5]
But this only means that they might be safe to bring
home--it
does NOT mean that Israel could 'afford' this, per se.
And this brings us to the 'welfare' point: this was still
NOT welfare at all--it was strictly an economic, trade-off matter. If you
could "pull-more-than-your-own-weight" (thereby contributing to the
survivability/vitality of an Israelite household), then you were an
"option" to bring home. As I mentioned before, there were no real welfare systems in place in
the ANE--if you took an unfortunate into your home, you had better (a)
have had significant excess resource/financial
capacity (i.e., be rich); or (b) bring someone in who could add more economic value than they cost.
[This is similar, btw, to hiring decisions by companies today. They
are going to pay an employee X, and they will not do this unless they
think they can get some X+Y value out of them.]
So, the main three criteria which would apply in any 'bring a PERSON home as plunder'
decision for a soldier would be:
One.
Will the
presence of this person be destructive of my family's cohesiveness or
unity? This eliminates the hostile, depraved religions of
Canaan*.* as well as any nation with deeply inbred hostility to Israel
(e.g. who would stab you in your sleep--as feared by Roman
slaveowners); but would also perhaps eliminate some 'extra wives'
(covered
later in Deut 20/21)--due to practical matters of wife-jealousy,
descendant inheritance conflicts, household living conditions, etc. And
this might also eliminate some
livestock goods (e.g., not being able to care for them long
enough to
sell them, etc). Also, social disapproval/mistrust of a foreign captive
might impact community interactions and business dealings.
Two. Do we have extra
resources at home to be used in supporting this individual for however
long it takes to make them a net
contributor to the household economic health and stability?
In other words, if those brought into the home are young, they will
require more-investment-than-return for some period (e.g., sustenance,
medical care, education, etc). If a family does not have the surplus of
resources to 'fund this', then this is not an option to the soldier.
[But again, this is not actually welfare per se--this is like
education/training or taking in a boarder, and is more
'investment-like'.]
Three. Does this person
have some useful skill that can be used (or developed quickly, and then
used) in helping the family in the battle for survival/stability? War
captives who could help with agriculture or husbandry or infrastructure
crafts are obvious candidates, but those without any such skills simply
could not be afforded.
[Four. There is a special
version of #3 which runs something like "Assuming they don't meet
conditions #1-3 above for my household,
can I nevertheless sell this
person quickly enough, and for enough
money (to be contributed to household vitality) into some other
household, to justify caring for them long enough to
market them?" This presumes an
adequate, accessible, and fluid market for such people. One can
immediately see that if a person did not meet these criteria for a
(statistically) normal Israelite
family, then the market for such individuals could be exceptionally small. Or, if they did meet these three criteria, and
yet there was a 'better candidate'
(e.g., a destitute Hebrew offering himself/herself/their family for the
position--probably the largest source of servant labor in ancient
Israel), then the market shrinks even further. Historically, of course,
such servitude was confined to wealthy families, and this would limit
the market 'upside' for the soldiers (e.g., demand would be far lower
than
'supply', and hence less economically appealing).
Now, let's look at each of these for the two cases: Amalek (early
in the reign of Saul) and Beyond-Transjordan (late in the reign of
David).
Criterion One: This is obvious.
As the citation above pointed out, the attitude difference between
Aramean women and Amalekite women is probably the
decisive one in our case. Also, apart entirely from the
religious/cultural influences, the Aramean would be less likely to attack you
(successfully, that is--due to skill set differences!) in your
sleep than would the Amalekite. The Amalekite would have 'fleeing'
skills, which would raise the risk, whereas the Aramean would not, etc.
[By way of comic illustration, and very relevant, note: In the list of
things a "Chief Evil OverLord" should do (many lists available on the
net), one of the sayings is: "No matter how attractive certain members
of the rebellion are, there is
probably someone just as attractive who is not desperate to kill me.
Therefore, I will think twice before ordering a prisoner sent to my
bedchamber."]
......................................................................................
Criterion Two: This
requires a little digging. Here we have to assess the relative 'wealth'
of the average Israelite household in these two time periods. The
Amalek incident occurs around 1028 BC, and any beyond-Transjordan
war activity (of which, btw, there is none
described in the bible--our Dt 20
passage is hypothetical and legislative only) would have occurred late
in David's reign around 925ish (around the revolt of Absalom?). That's
only a 50 year time span, but the difference it made in economic impact
was staggering.
Let's note first that Saul's reign began in the devastated environment
of the period of the Judges.
Saul is the first king, selected when Samuel was still judging Israel.
As such he inherited the financial and territorial situation at the end
of the book of Judges--a rather bleak situation:
"Saul lived in troubled times. For some
time Israel had been simply a loose confederation of twelve tribes with
no single leader. Judges had arisen under the call of God to serve in
various regions of the land in times of crisis. There had been a common
sanctuary at Shiloh, but it was now destroyed (4:12-22; Jer 7:14; 26:6,
9). New invaders from the islands of the sea, the Philistines, had
settled along the Mediterranean coast and
had pushed up into the
highlands. Israel had no military organization which was capable
of
stopping the invaders.
Nor did they
have weapons, for the Philistines had established a monopoly in the
making and the maintenance of iron tools (1 Sam 13:19-22). The
Philistines had made Saul’s home town, Gibeah, into an outpost (10:5;
13:3). [
ZPEB]
"Saul lived during a very critical
period in the history of the Israelite tribes. Though the dates cannot
be determined with any certainty, he lived during the latter half of
the 11th century B.C. and probably ruled as king from about 1020–1000
B.C. Before he became king, the Israelite tribes were on the verge of
military collapse. The Philistines, a powerful military people, had
settled along the Mediterranean coast; they were well established on
the coast and planned to move eastward and take control of Palestine as
a whole. In order to do this, they first had to eliminate the
Israelites, who were settled in the hill country on the west of the
Jordan, and also in Transjordan. The absence of any strong and
permanent military authority among the Israelites meant that the
Philistines were a grave military threat to the continued existence of
Israel.... The immediate crisis, which was to contribute to Saul’s rise
to power, was a crushing defeat of the Israelite army by the
Philistines at Ebenezer, in the vicinity of Aphek. The victory gave the
Philistines more or less complete control of Israelite territories
lying to the west of the Jordan;
they attempted to maintain that
control by establishing military garrisons throughout the country which
they had captured. Israel, weakened by the Philistine defeat, became
vulnerable to enemies on other borders. The nation of Ammon,
situated
to the east of the Israelites’ land in Transjordan, attacked and laid
siege to the town of Jabesh (1 Sm 11:1). Saul, summoning an army of
volunteers, delivered the inhabitants of Jabesh and defeated the
Ammonites. It was after this event that Saul became king. He had
already been anointed a prince or leader among the people by Samuel;
after his military success at Jabesh, he assumed the office formally at
the sanctuary in Gilgal (v 15).... The defeat of the Ammonites provided
a significant boost to Israelite morale, but it did not significantly change the
military crisis and threat posed by the Philistines. Indeed, the location of Saul’s appointment to
kingship is significant. Gilgal, in the Jordan Valley near Jericho, was
chosen partly because the earlier shrine of Shiloh was held by the
Philistines. Gilgal was in one of
the few areas remaining outside
Philistine control. Saul was faced with an
extraordinarily difficult task as military commander. His home ground
had the advantage of being reasonably easy to protect, for most of it
was mountainous countryside. But he
was surrounded on all four sides by enemies who wanted his land, he had
inadequate weapons (for Philistines controlled the supply of iron), he
had no large standing army, he had inadequate communication systems,
and he did not have the wholehearted support of all the Israelites.
For several years, he was relatively successful against almost
impossible odds, but eventually his military genius failed.... The
Philistines assembled a large army in the vicinity of Aphek, but
instead of attacking Saul’s mountain territory directly, the army moved
northward and then began to penetrate Israelite territory at a weak
point in the vicinity of Jezreel. Saul attempted to gather an adequate
military force to meet the Philistine threat, but was unable to do so.
With inadequate preparation and insufficient forces, he prepared for
battle at Mt Gilboa; he should never have entered that battle, for it
could not have been won. His sons were killed on the battlefield, and
Saul, rather than fall into the hands of the Philistines, committed
suicide...From a military perspective, Saul had become king at a time
of crisis; he had averted disaster and gained some respite for his
country. But the battle in which he died was a disaster for Israel; the country he left behind after his death
was in worse straits than
it had been on his assumption of power."
[BEB]
We can contrast this with summary assessments of David's reign:
"No doubt the capture of Jerusalem was
part of a pattern. David could not allow the Canaanite cities to retain
their independence, remaining potential centers of disaffection. We
have no details of their capture; probably there was little or no real
opposition to David. Thus consolidating his own realm, David next meant
to subdue Israel’s ancient foes. Philistia was presumably the first to
capitulate; Moab and Edom soon followed (2 S. 8:2, 13f). If 10:1f is to
be believed, David had no aggressive intentions toward Ammon; but the
king of Ammon, Hanun, feared Israel’s growing power, and insulted
David’s envoys in a very ill-advised fashion. David could not overlook
this, and warfare resulted, Hanun hastily forming alliances with some
Aramean states to the north of Ammon. David was victorious, and
finally captured Hanun’s capital, Rabbah (Rabbath Ammon, the modern
Amman) (12:26ff).
It must have been
subsequent to this that David made most of Syria tributary (8:3–12);
the allies of Ammon had to be pursued and punished. David was now at
the pinnacle of success, master of a considerable empire. His
victories were due largely to his own abilities, although Joab must
also have been a very able soldier. The weakness of Egypt and the
Mesopotamian states during this period also contributed to David’s
success.... David began his reign as vassal ruler of a small, disunited
people, and
ended it as the master of
a considerable empire, with not a few vassals of his own." [
ISBE]
"(2 Sam 8:1–18). Following this theological highlight, we have a
rather mundane catalog of David’s further military victories, over
Philistines and Moabites (8:1–2), Arameans (8:3–8), Edomites (8:13–14),
and others (8:12), and of his acclaim by the king of Hamath (8:9–12).
Its function is to show further that YHWH was with David and that he
was an effective warrior and ruler (8:6b, 14b–15).
The extent of
David’s kingdom was impressive: it reached the Mediterranean in the W,
the N Sinai desert in the S, much of Transjordan in the E, and it
approached the Euphrates in the N (cf. 24:5–7)." [
REF:ABD]
Economic wealth in the ANE was largely a function
of fertile land ownership and/or dominion
over fertile lands. The
most fertile lands in Palestine are along the coastal plain, the
northern valleys (in Galilee), and the Jordan valley. To the extent
ancient Israel had access to these areas (and smaller such tracts), to
that same extent economic prosperity was possible. Of course, foreign
countries also had desirable land, and they also desired Israel's land
(expansionist). To the extent ancient Israel was dominated by foreign
power, to that extent any wealth
would be drained off in tribute. And,
conversely, to the extent Israel dominated
a foreign power, to that
extent wealth flowed into Israel (in the form of tribute/taxes).
By comparing the land-area of the respective kingdoms (both occupied
by Israel and dominated by Israel), one can form an vague/imprecise
notion of
the relative scale of
economic wealth.
First, let's look at the actual
land-area occupied by Israel, for the Saul and David/Solomon
realms:
The first chart is of Saul; the second one of
David/Solomon. The pink/purple area is that actually occupied by
Israelites. [Colored Charts from Logos
Deluxe Maps set]
Notice that Saul's area has very, very little fertile plains/valley
areas, whereas that of David does.
Next, here is a combined dominion map,
showing the areas of each [the RED outline
is of Saul's area; original maps from New Bible Atlas].
This is a massive increase in revenue-producing areas, and was
accomplished by the incessant war efforts of David (most of it provoked
by hostile attacks by outsiders, though).
Now, given a vastly larger economic base,
what about the population
base (to get to 'per capita' type comparisons)?
What is odd is that the various troop counts and census figures (given
for both David and Saul, at different times) reflect about the same
population levels. This means that overall average wealth grew, even if it
might have been concentrated at the higher end of the socio-economic
spectrum (an elite class does become more prominent in the biblical
record). The amounts of gold/silver left by David to Solomon for the
temple were gained from the half-century of dominion expansions (and
not from internal taxation on increased access to fertile land--that 'new wealth' would have
remained in the hands of the populace). Saul had no such
large-scale financial hoard at
his death. He did have some plunder that he dedicated to the
tabernacle/central site, but most of his surviving estate was
wealth drained
from people in Israel (i.e., a tax system)--not a net-gain for
the nation.
So, as for Criterion Two,
there is a significant difference between the ability of Israel to
absorb financial liabilities (i.e., young or needy war captives),
between the two reigns.
...................................................................................................
Criterion Three (Useful
skills): There seems to be a major gap here as well. The slave-trading,
raiding-bandit, plunder-merchant society requires a different skill set
of its wives and
young sons. Sons would learn tactics of raiding, stealth, prisoner
subjugation, bargaining, ambush, deceit/camouflage, and race-riding.
Wives would have somewhat more
generic skills such as cooking and child-rearing, but many of the
'standard toolkit' skills would not be
necessary: agriculture, long term pastoral care, clothing manufacture,
education(?), house/furniture construction, pottery making, and real
estate
transactions. [Cf the tasks of the 'excellent wife' in Proverbs 31,
which includes working in wool, flax, and linen (with distaff/spindle);
buying land; planting a vineyard, selling home-made garments].
So, as for Criterion Three,
this is also a significant difference, and
one that would have been a show-stopper in this case.
But we should also point out that even if the requisite skill set
existed in a captive, the need for these services might still be better rendered by someone
of local/Hebrew background, rather than a
recently-at-war-with-you captive! (point #1), as we will point out
below...
..........................................................................................................
Criterion Four (Slave markets).
This will take a little digging too, since we have so little data about
actual slave trade within ancient Israel.
General assessments of slave usage within
Israel during this time (one
possible market for a
soldier returning with a captive) is very, very low, especially in this
time:
"Slaves were
relatively rare in the small-scale
family-centered
Palestinian agricultural economy..." [
HI:LCCAI,
170]
"We have very little information about the number of domestic slaves in
Israel. Gideon took
ten of
his servants to demolish the sanctuary of Baal (Jg 6:27). Abigal, wife
of the wealthy Naba, has an
unstated number
of slaves, and when she went to marry David, she took
five maidservants with her (1 Sam
25.19,42). After Saul's death, the property of the royal family was
valued by Siba, a steward, who had fifteen sons and
twenty slaves of his own (2 Sam
9.10). Some large landowners in the days of the monarchy
may have had a comparatively large
household, but they were the
exceptions."
[De Vaux, I:84]
The smaller the market, the less the incentive--unless prices were
very, very high. And prices don't seem to be such: the 30 shekels figure in Ex 21 for slave replacement would
be equivalent to 2.5 years pay for a common worker (and, as a penalty,
could be much higher than actual market prices).
But where
exactly was the
market? Where did you go
to buy or sell such slaves?
We really don't know. There are no designated/obvious areas in any of
the markets in the cities of Roman Palestine (or even in the eastern
Mediterranean, for that matter). We assume they are bought or sold (1)
as traveling merchants pass through a major city, or (2) in harbor
markets along the coast.
"We learn from 2
Kings 13:20 and Amos 1:13 that there were Moabite and Ammonite raids.
This meant the capture of peoples as slaves, and the Philistines and Phoenicians in the coastal
cities gladly profited from the resulting
slave trade." [BANE:240]
Since slave trade typically required long-distance transport, sea
travel was the least expensive means of this--and we are back to port
cities again:
"
selling
captives. One of the most lucrative aspects of warfare and
border raiding was the slave trade.
Captives
were easily sold to dealers, who would transport them far from their homeland
(see Ezek 27:13; Joel 3:6–7)... The actual number of such persons
does not compare to the huge numbers of slaves found in Greek and Roman
cities. The slave trade existed from earliest times in the ancient Near
East. Slaves were generally war captives
or persons taken in raids. Traders
often accepted slaves,
which they transported to new areas and sold.
These persons seldom obtained their freedom. The
vast majority of persons who ended
up on the slave block were
either sold
to the slavers
by their own families
or
were prisoners of war.". [
REF:BBC]
Now, when you think about how this works, you see that we are not talking about a 'local market' in which
a war captive is sold to another Hebrew in another village across the
valley. There seems to be no mention of this type of market in
the United Monarchy, and all indications are that slaves are not sold between 'end-users',
but through a middle-man (slavetrader). The 'far distances'
aspect can be understood as a natural deterrent (but not always
effective--there are many documents about runaway slaves from
antiquity) against a slave running away from their new situation,
hoping to get back home. [One might compare the two slaves of Shimei in
Jerusalem who escaped and returned back to the coast. He was able to
chase them down and recover them, but they must have had family/friends
on the coast. I Kings 2] [Note: Much later, in the Divided
Monarchy, the northern kingdom
did appear to develop local
markets, as reflected in Amos 8.6, but their attempted subjugation/sale
of 200,000 war-captive Judahites in 2 Chron 28 might have been to the
northern markets of Damascus or the Tyre connection.]
Coastal cities/cultures are condemned
in the OT/Tanaach for
such large-scale slave trade, so we can assume it was done there. But we can
also assume by the
very prophetic denunciation of such practice (one of which is
targeted at Israel specifically!!!),
that there would have been a major
social stigma associated with such--for the average Joel Hebrew.
Compare
the strong words of Amos 1-2 (a couple of centuries later, as the elite
classes became more prevalent under the
Divided Monarchy):
“For three sins of Gaza,
even for four, I will not turn back my wrath.
Because she took
captive whole communities
and sold them to
Edom,
...
“For three sins of Tyre,
even for four, I will not turn back my wrath.
Because she sold
whole communities of captives to Edom,
disregarding a treaty of brotherhood,
...
“For three sins of Israel,
even for four, I will not turn back my wrath.
They sell the righteous
for silver,
and the needy for a
pair of sandals.
Edom was not a major user of
slaves (except in mining
enterprises), but was an exporter of
slaves--she had the most important port into the Red Sea, Ezion-geber
on the Gulf of Aqaba. This port was prominent in the biblical record
and important enough for the city of Tyre to have shipbuilders there
(cf. 1 Kgs 9:26; 22:49; 2 Chr 8:17, 20:36).
So, the average Israelite soldier would likely have to 'do the deal'
with (1) a traveling merchant in a major
city or trade-route, or (2) traveling to the coastal
areas of the Philistines or Phoenicians (Coastal Canaanites/Sidonians,
of which Tyre was the major port around Israel).
Since very few Israelites lived in a 'major city' at the time of Saul
(they did not even have control of Jerusalem), this market outlet would
not
have been available in the case of selling an Amalekite captive. But,
toward the end of David's reign, Israel had developed (or finally been
able to use or control) a few such cities (e.g., Jerusalem, Jericho,
perhaps the thoroughfare along the Sea of Galilee) and had access to
markets in Damascus. But the average Israelite would not be able to
travel very far to do his/her slave trading, and with access to
any
slave-merchants being minimal.
We can probably assume that some foreign
merchants would buy captives in Jerusalem, but that most merchants
would try to avoid transporting such difficult 'cargo' over land.
So, if there was a market for slaves (which a soldier would have access
to) apart from the coastal cities, then it would likely have been
inaccessible in the main, for most Israelite soldiers.
That leaves the coastal markets: the Philistines
and Tyre/Sidon.
There is obviously a problem with commerce with Philistia during the reign of Saul,
since he was constantly trying to defeat them in war. Before Saul took
rulership, commerce between vassal Israel and Philistia was
everyday--even if it was onerous. The picture in the book of Judges is
one of frequent interaction (and intermarriage), and at the coronation
of Saul, Israelites were required to have their tools sharpened in
Philistine shops. But once hostilities reached fever pitch,
relationships would not be 'commercial' again, until after David had
subjected them. So, the soldiers who fought against Amalek would not
have had the Philistine market to sell a captive to; whereas a soldier
fighting 50 years later in TransTransJordan would conceivably
have had access to that market.
Tyre/Sidon are more plausible
market candidates, since they had just become independent states and
were on friendly terms with Israel during the Monarchy (cf. the trade
relations with David, and the parentage of Hiram in 1 Kgs 7.14). The
main problem, of course, was that these were the original
Baal-worshipers (e.g. Jezebel was from Tyre; and Ugarit is considered
Phoenician in origin too) and Israel was not supposed to be on friendly
terms with them--especially at the end of the period of the Judges. But
probably of more relevance is the distance involved for the average
Israelite. The southernmost port was at Acco (Dor was a Philistine
city, most likely) which was accessible from northern Galilee, but only
accessible from there. Just below them were the Philistines,
whom we
have already discussed. This means that only Israelites from that
territory (Asher, Naphtali, Zebulun, Issachar) would be reasonable
candidates--and they are not prominent players in the wars of Saul
(they are actually NOT EVEN MENTIONED in any of the Saulide
narratives!)..
So, all things considered, the opportunity for gainful slave-trading
for a soldier in the case of Amalek would have been almost nil; and the
opportunity for a soldier under David fifty years later would have only
been slightly better (accessible, but expensive due to
travel/maintenance costs).
So, as for Criterion Four,
this is also a significant difference.
.......................................................................
But there is one other factor to consider here, especially for local-use or local-sale probabilities (as opposed
to traveling to the coast and selling to a long-distance trader): the availability of better,
'competitive' products.
As is often noted, the vast majority of the servitude in the ancient
world (before Rome) was voluntary--one
sold oneself or one's family members into slavery, for their welfare or
for the welfare of the remainder of the family. The poor sold
themselves and
parents sold children. Although some of these would be considered
long-term (i.e, for life), Israel had two forms of temporary servitude:
the 6-year contract with freedom at the end, and the same contract but
with an early-termination date created by being bought-back by one's
family (i.e. 'redemption'). This looked just like regular ANE
'slavery'--the person lived with the family, was provided for, and
worked to support the household--but just had a fixed-length duration.
There are several reasons why any Hebrew NEEDING such a servant would
choose this 'source of
supply' rather than a war-captive
(or raiding-captive, as well):
- Obviously, there would be no
'hostile element' in the home. As a voluntary situation, the
arrangement would be a cause of thanks for the destitute Hebrew, and
none of the 'kill me in my sleep' elements would be present.
- It was a temporary
financial commitment, so the investment
risk was low. A life-long slave is just that--a long term
responsibility, regardless of family fortunes. As the servant got
older, their re-sale value would decline and so changes in family
fortunes might force a serious loss. With a six-year
commitment/contract, on the other hand, a householder could continue to
re-contract with other Hebrews every six years until either the
workload had disappeared or until finances no longer allowed the wage
payment.
- There was an instant payback.
There would be no language or cultural barriers to overcome, these were
almost always young adults with basic education, and they would have
had skillsets appropriate to daily life requirements for Israel at that
time.
- There was no actual payment
required (until the going-away party at the end)! When you bought a slave, you paid
the slave-trader for the person and THEN had
full financial support requirements for them. In the case of a six-year
servant, you only had the support requirements--there WAS no 'sale
price' out of pocket!
- With a Hebrew servant, social
acceptance would have already been there--your community would
be able to 'associate' with him/her. With a non-Israelite, certain
ethnic and religious prejudices would likely be a retardant to business
relationships.
- With relatives around (who could perhaps later do the redemption
process), the servant would have
incentive to act with honor, faithfulness,
and diligence, and not bring shame upon his/her family. This
cultural value would work in favor of the temporary 'master'.
Given these considerable advantages of a Hebrew servant over a foreign
war captive, the sheer competitive pressures would make the taking of a
war-captive (for local-use or for local-resale) unappealing. In
distinction to "state slaves" (i.e., those bought/captured by the
government to serve in public service)--which is NOT in view in Deut
20-- the private, soldier, captive-into-slave process would probably be
very infrequent.
...............................................
So,
where does
this lead/leave us?
Let's summarize our points so far:
- Deut20 deals with TransTransJordan (beyond Transjordan) cities,
wealthy, Aramean, opportunistic, 'enemy' of Israel (perhaps only because of vassal treaty
though--another difference from Amalek).
- Most cases in which Deut20 would apply would resolve toward the
'surrender and pay taxes' solution--unusually ('unreasonably'?) lenient
and even protective of the city (as a new 'border town').
- In cases in which the city did have to be conquered,
surviving/remaining women/children (who were NOT carried into captivity
by Israelite soldiers) would have a good infrastructure and good
skill-base to survive and rebuild upon.
- [This would not be the
case with Amalekite women/children.]
- It is not a requirement (in the case of non-surrender in Deut20)
that the women/children be carried off as 'plunder'. They can, but
there is no hard-and-fast obligation upon the army to carry every soul
back to Israel.
- The women of Deut20 would be much 'safer' to bring home than
those of Amalek, due to cultural and attitudinal differences.
- This 'risk difference' would be manifest in matters of physical
safety, intra-family relationships, social and business relationships.
- Soldiers at the time of Saul/Amalek would have had very little
ability to 'absorb' the costs of incoming women/children refugees (if
any capacity at all). In David's time, this was considerably better.
- Any women taken home as servants in the Deut20 scenario would
have had skills appropriate to, and contributory of,
household/community
survival/welfare. Amalekite women would have virtually none of these
necessary skills.
- Soldiers in the Amalekite scenario would have had no accessible
markets wherein to actually sell the captives (since they couldn't
absorb the cost themselves); but soldiers under David would have had a
few more
options (although still fairly expensive).
- There were strong religious and social forces against
slave-trading, and this would have reduced greatly the number of
soldiers trying this.
- The Mosaic provision for short-term, renewable, lower-risk,
lower-cost, socially-acceptable, and instant payback Hebrew servants
virtually eliminates the basic appeal/incentive for foreign slaves of
ANY source (e.g., Deut20 or Amalek).
So, I think your answer is in there somewhere. The dominant reason
might be the deep-seated hatred "danger factor", but the economic,
skillset, market difficulty, and better local options factors also add
considerable weight to this difference of policy.
I hope this helps friend,
glenn
Sept 23/2006
-------------------------------------------------------
[ .... nowelfare.html ........ ]
The Christian ThinkTank...[https://www.Christianthinktank.com]
(Reference Abbreviations)